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Abstract 
This paper introduces the philosophy of Grace Andrus de Laguna in order to renew interest in it. I 
show that, in the 1910s and 1920s, she develops ideas and arguments that are also found playing 
key roles in the development of analytic philosophy decades later. Further, I describe her 
sympathetic, but acute, criticism of pragmatism and Heideggerian ontology, and situate her work in 
the tradition of American, speculative philosophy. Before 1920, we will see, de Laguna appeals to 
multiple realizability to undermine reductionism in science, to support perspectival, scientific realism 
and, with help from a private language argument, to favour the view that mental states are classified 
by behavioural, teleological roles over what came to be called ‘type physicalism’. Her view of speech, 
mostly developed in the 1920s, tells us that its primary role is coordinating group behaviour rather 
than expressing thoughts. Belief is understood in terms of its causal role, including its causal 
relations to other kinds of mental states, when coordinating group behaviour. Thought is similarly 
understood. In developing her theory of mind, de Laguna rejects the pragmatist claims that belief 
can be reduced to dispositions to behaviour and that thought’s function is to address specific, rather 
than general, problems. She also favours meaning holism and rejects the analytic-synthetic 
distinction. In later work, de Laguna argues that individuals’ activity of self-maintenance brings 
universals, conceived of as irreducible potentialities, into being and makes them increasingly 
determinate. Further, she identifies the existence of all individuals with forms of self-maintenance 
and takes the existence of people to include maintenance of the cultural world. Such a unified 
treatment of existence, she holds, permits making its evolution intelligible. Heidegger’s view of being 
is rejected for not permitting this. All de Laguna’s work, we will see, fits a vision of philosophy as the 
systematic, imaginative and naturalistic examination of being as well as a source of criticism of 
science. 
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1. Introduction 
Grace Andrus de Laguna (1878-1978) was a prominent philosopher during much of the first half of 
the twentieth century, though her work has been forgotten.1 I aim to present some of her main 
ideas and arguments, and to relate these to influential work in analytic philosophy, pragmatism and 
continental philosophy. I pay only limited attention to her work’s historical context. We will see that 
many of the theses and arguments that she put forward in the early decades of the twentieth 
century are also found playing key roles in the post-1950 development of analytic philosophy, that 
she provided sympathetic, but acute, criticism of pragmatism and Heideggerian ontology, and that 
her work belonged to the speculative philosophical tradition in America. My motivation for drawing 
attention to de Laguna’s work includes its intrinsic merits and improving our understanding of the 
development of philosophy during the first half of the twentieth century. 
2. De Laguna’s realist perspectivism about science 
De Laguna was a proponent of realist perspectivism, a view that is neatly captured in her 1934 
paper, ‘Appearance and orientation’: “the percipient–and in an extended sense, the knower–
apprehends things from a particular standpoint” but nevertheless does apprehend things as they 
really are (1934, pp. 72 & 77). She presents her perspectivism about scientific knowledge, which is 
my focus here, primarily in two 1917 papers, namely ‘Phenomena and their determination’ (PD) and 
‘The limits of the physical’ (LP). Science reveals a variety of systems of patterns, including physical, 
biological, psychological and historical ones. Each of these systems includes at least some kinds of 
individuals, and patterns involving these kinds, that are key to understanding the system and are not 
to be found in other systems. This implies that, for any two of the systems, if some kind from any 
one of the two is located at a variety of space-time loci, there need be no corresponding kind from 
 
1 Peter Olen’s, ‘Consequences of Behaviorism: Sellars and de Laguna on Explanation’ (2017) and my, ‘The de 
Lagunas’ Dogmatism and Evolution, overcoming modern philosophy and making post-Quinean analytic 
philosophy’ (forthcoming) are the only recent papers on de Laguna that I am aware of. 
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the other system at all those loci. Nor is there any prospect of explaining the patterns of one system 
solely with those of another. As de Laguna summarises it,  
[t]he world as it exists for science is a vast network of patterns, the different systems of 
which overlap and mingle, but which we cannot resolve into a single system of design. The 
units which we find to be the key of one pattern turn out to be misleading clues when we try 
to apply them elsewhere (1917a, p. 625). 
Indeed, we will see that the historical and psychological systems supposedly include individuals and 
events that cannot be identified with anything physical. 
Nevertheless, de Laguna’s perspectivism tells us that the systems of individuals discerned by 
different sciences are intimately related. The same kinds and individuals may, to begin with, feature 
in multiple systems (ibid., p. 625). Thus, in the next section, we will see de Laguna arguing that the 
human central nervous system is a physiological and a sociological kind. So too, de Laguna’s 
perspectivism tells us that all nonphysical kinds and individuals resolve into–or, as more recent work 
might put it, are realised by–physical phenomena and thus can be redescribed using the terms of 
physics, even if, from the resulting perspective, at least some kinds and individuals will turn out to be 
fictitious (ibid., p. 630; 1917b, pp. 182-183). What the relationships between the patterns, kinds and 
individuals of different fields are, e.g., whether psychological kinds are physical kinds, is an empirical 
matter (1917a, pp. 662-663; 1917b, pp. 182-183). 
LP and PD examine the relations between kinds, and between individuals, from a variety of 
special sciences, including between kinds from history and each of psychology, physiology, biology 
and physics. The papers use their results about the cases of numerical distinctness they uncover in 
order to target specific anti-perspectivist positions and, in doing so, to support aspects of 
perspectivism. The distinctness of a kind in one field of science from any kind found in another is 
supported by appealing to cases of what we would call ‘multiple realizability’. In the cases appealed 
to, instances of a kind of event or state from field of science A cannot be resolved into instances of 
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any single kind of event or state from field of science B. Instead, instances of the kind studied by A 
are only resolvable into–in the more recent terminology, are only realised by–constituents that, 
from B’s perspective, are unrelated to each other.2 Assume we have such an instance of a kind of 
event that is studied by A. According to de Laguna, the relevant constituent events that are studied 
by B are not classifiable by it as belonging to a single kind. From this she concludes that A has at least 
some principles of classification that classify in ways that are out of reach of B, and thus that there 
are some kinds recognised by A that cannot be identified with any that might be recognised by B. 
LP, for example, appeals to the Democratic victory of 1916 in order to support the view that 
historical kinds are not physical kinds. She observes that 
[t]he particular event which occurred last November is resolvable into a vast mass of 
occurrences, such as the going to the respective polls of the voters all over the country, the 
marking of ballots, the subsequent fall of the ballots into the boxes, etc. And each of these 
occurrences may be similarly broken up, until, as an ideal limit, we may conceive that whole 
group of events which constituted the election and the Democratic victory as a multitude of 
redistributions of mass and transformations of energy. Every detail is accounted for, nothing 
is omitted. In a like manner we may conceive other events of the same class, Democratic 
victories of former years, described in detail as groups of physical occurrences. 
But if we now proceed to collate and compare these descriptions of the particular 
cases, in order to formulate a general description, we find that they present no 
characteristic identity. If they were not already given as belonging to the same class, we 
should never be led by our physical analysis to class them together. But this means that the 
phenomenon 'Democratic victory' is not a physical event (1917b, pp. 179-180). 
 
2 Recent, standard candidate cases of multiple realizability are cases in which a kind is supposed to be realized 
by a variety of other kinds rather than by disunited arrangements of constituents. But, current conceptions of 
multiple realizability permit disunited realisation (see, e.g., Gillett 2003, p. 594). Further, the realisers we will 
consider in de Laguna’s discussion of the mind-body problem are kinds. 
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So, if physics considers the physical realisers of multiple Democratic victories, it will not be able to 
find that these realisers are of a common kind. But if physics cannot, in principle, even recognise 
Democratic victories as a kind, such victories are not intelligibly thought of as a physical kind in the 
first place (ibid., p. 178). 
LP and DP argue that individuals from one scientific domain are not to be identified with any 
individuals in another domain with the help of the idea that, if a science is able to identify a 
collection of items as an individual, then the science will possess principles of individuation and 
classification for similar collections and thus will systematically relate the collection to other 
collections it recognises (1917a, p. 632; 1917b, p. 181). If an event involving a single individual from 
A is resolved into a collection of events studied by B and that collection is not related in a systematic 
way by B to other collections of events it recognises, then B does not have a principle of 
individuation that relates the collection to others. Thus, the collection is not a real phenomenon 
from the perspective of B. LP appeals, once again, to the Democratic victory of 1916: 
[t]he Democratic victory of last November is resolvable, we said, into a multitude of physical 
occurrences. But when so resolved, it has lost all claim to be considered as a single event. It 
is not even a complex of physical occurrences, for the physical occurrences which constitute 
it have no physical connection with each other except via the whole universe. From the 
standpoint of physical science the selection of the scattered occurrences which constitute 
this event is perfectly arbitrary. It would be just as reasonable to group together the falling 
of snowflakes over the mound which marks Scott's grave in the Antarctic, the spring of a 
tiger in the jungles of Africa, and the purchase of a set of furs by the czarina of Russia, and 
call them an event (ibid., p. 181). 
The Democratic victory is thus not only no physical kind, but no physical event at all. 
PD appeals to specific cases of multiple realizability, and to specific cases in which individuals 
from one system are not recognised by another, primarily to object to forms of atomism. One 
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targeted form of atomism is psychological atomism, that is, the view that all the objects of sense 
perception are analysable into groups of sense data and relations between sense data. PD notes that 
physical kinds such as the yearly coming of winter do not correlate with similar groups of sense data; 
subjective experience is too variable for this. Thus, the coming of winter and other physical events 
are not psychological kinds. This also means, since physical laws relate physical kinds, that physical 
laws cannot be analysed in terms of relations between groups of sense data (1917a, pp. 631-632). 
LP primarily aims to criticise views according to which all things are ultimately physical or are 
ultimately explicable in physical terms. LP also aims to undermine a motivation for such views. 
According to de Laguna, the temptation to think that all phenomena can be explained in physical 
terms is driven by an induction. Failed past attempts to posit limits to physical explanation have led 
many to conclude that whatever exists or occurs anywhere falls under, and thus can be explained by, 
physical laws (1917b, pp. 177-178). But what events such as the Democratic victory of 1916 illustrate 
is that, when non-physical phenomena are resolved into physical ones, the results need not be 
recognisable by physics as belonging to any kind or even as being individuals. There is thus no 
prospect that these phenomena might be subject to physical laws, or might be explained by physics 
(ibid., pp. 179-181). Further, once we realise that physics describes phenomena from a specific 
perspective, that is, under the assumption of certain forms of classification and individuation, we will 
no longer be tempted to think that physical phenomena explain everything, or that all phenomena 
are ultimately physical (ibid., pp. 182-183).  
De Laguna’s perspectivism is akin to the analysis of experience offered (Thilly 1925) by her 
Hegelian teacher, James Edwin Creighton. So too, her perspectivism resembles the objective 
relativism that begins (Murphy 1927) to be clear in the work of Alfred N. Whitehead and John Dewey 
after the publication of PD and LP. It would be interesting to compare her views to these others. 
Here, however, I focus on the implications of her arguments for the forms of scientific reductionism 
that came to dominate analytic philosophy of science in the twentieth century. Initially, these forms 
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of reductionism were dominated by logical positivist positions such as the view that all empirical 
statements can be translated into a single, universal language, with physical and phenomenological 
languages being offered as candidate universal languages (Neurath 1931; Carnap 1934). Later 
influential forms of reductionism within analytic philosophy identify reduction with deduction or 
explanation. For example, Ernest Nagel (1961) identified reduction with deduction and held that 
science should aim to deduce all natural science from a single theory. De Laguna’s perspectivism is 
an alternative to such reductionist ambitions, one according to which these ambitions rest on a 
failure to realise the limitations of the forms of classification and individuation, and by implication 
the forms of explanation, available to special sciences. De Laguna’s arguments against atomism and 
reductivism, further, are acute. The challenges posed by multiple realizability are among the main 
challenges posed to reductivist projects in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind and 
other fields of philosophy, though recent historiography (e.g., Ney 2008) has it that the use of 
multiple realizability to challenge reductivism only emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with 
the work of Hilary Putnam (1967) and Jerry Fodor (1974). Interestingly, however, even this work 
from the 1960s and 1970s fails fully to address de Laguna’s appeal to individuation. Fodor, for 
example, appeals to multiple realizability in order to argue that we cannot expect each natural kind 
characterised in the special sciences to turn out to be a physical kind (ibid., pp. 102-106). He, 
however, insists that each token event is a token physical one (ibid., pp. 107-110). De Laguna’s 
appeal to multiple realizability is similar to Fodor’s, as is her conclusion about natural kinds, but her 
appeal to individuation suggests that some events are not physical ones. 
 
3. Dissolving the mind-body problem 
De Laguna’s 1918 paper, ‘The empirical correlation of mental and bodily phenomena’ (EC) deploys 
considerations similar to those of DP and LP in order to dissolve the mind-body problem. According 
to EC, mental phenomena and those of the central nervous system are to be individuated and 
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classified by their roles in guiding behaviour in the physical, and in some cases even the social, 
environment. The two classes of phenomena thus turn out to be part of the same order of nature 
and their interrelations are, accordingly, explicable. This, further, suggests that the mind-body 
problem is based on a mistake. The problem arises, according to de Laguna, because phenomena of 
the central nervous system are assumed to be individuated and classified in a way that is entirely 
different from the way mental phenomena are individuated and classified. This assumption makes 
the interrelations between nervous and mental phenomena mysterious (1918a, pp. 535-536). 
 EC offers a general argument for thinking that the central nervous system and its subsystems 
are to be individuated and classified in terms of their functions in controlling behaviour. According to 
this argument, the nervous system is not primarily a physiological organ, that is, its primary function 
is not that of maintaining life. Its primary function, rather, is “the adjustment of the behavior of the 
individual as a whole to the outer world of goods and dangers which constitutes his environment” 
(1918a, p. 536). Thus, the phenomena of the nervous system can only be properly understood when 
they are classified in terms of their function in adapting behaviour to external circumstances, 
including, in the case of humans, social circumstances. De Laguna illustrates this claim with an 
example provided by John Watson. She writes, reflecting on Watson’s observation that some mental 
disorders cannot be ascribed to physiological problems within the cortex, that 
[i]f Professor Watson is right, it is evident–though he himself apparently does not draw the 
conclusion–that normal and abnormal functioning of the cerebral cortex may be 
distinguished, not on the basis of any determinable physiological differences, but by the 
relative appropriateness of the cerebrally controlled behavior to environmental–say even 
social–conditions (1918a, p. 536). 
EC further supports its claim about the individuation and classification of the actions of the 
central nervous system by examining the classification of such actions when they relate to 
emotions–fear is her example here–and to perception. Research, we are told, has not located fear 
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“and other emotions in the cortex or in the lower centers” (ibid., p. 537). Indeed, the indefinitely 
varied causes of, and responses to, fear in humans and other species means it must be connected to 
“considerable diversity of nervous activity”, so that similarity of physiological characteristics is not 
what unifies cases of fear (ibid., p. 537). At the same time, fear responses are classified as such 
because of their role in the economy of life. Similarly, “it is the identity of the part played in this 
economy by the differing cortical and sub-cortical processes exciting these responses that 
determines the identity of the correlated conscious experience” (ibid., p. 538). In other terms, 
cortical processes and sub-cortical processes with the appropriate roles are thereby fear processes. 
Even if a fear centre were discovered in the central nervous system, it would be identified as such 
because of its role (ibid., p 538). De Laguna treats the neurological correlates of perception similarly. 
She does, to be sure, accept that perceptions of simple qualities like colour have neurological 
correlates but argues that these too are identified by their roles in larger complexes (ibid., p. 539). 
 De Laguna supports the claim that mental phenomena are individuated and classified in the 
same way as those of the nervous system by criticising an alternative. She notes that science and 
common sense take sense-qualities to be classified “on the basis of immediately felt identities and 
differences” (ibid., p. 539). She objects to this view by appealing to a private language argument: 
mental phenomena can be made intelligible 
only by reference, direct or indirect, to their function in securing the adjustment of the 
individual to his environment, physical and social. The fear which the psychologist studies is 
not a hidden feeling cherished within his breast; it is precisely that feeling which is inspired 
by determinate objective conditions, and which impels him to characteristic expressions and 
acts. He can identify a given experience to himself as "fear" only in so far as it sends cold 
shivers down his back, or gives him a sinking in the pit of his stomach or makes his knees 
shake beneath him. But even these private earmarks are phrases whose significance is set by 
common usage (ibid., pp. 540-541). 
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De Laguna is pointing out that the actual way in which fear is referred to, and thus in which ‘fear’ 
acquires its significance and classifies, is by reference to fear’s impact on expressions and behaviour. 
Moreover, attempting to fix the meaning of ‘fear’ by inner ostension fails because, in identifying an 
instance of fear as belonging to the class of fears, one can but make use of other terms that acquire 
their significance in the public way ‘fear’ does. Importantly, de Laguna does not deny that there 
might be inherently private states, involving what we would call ‘qualia’, associated with fear. Her 
point, rather, is that what ‘fear’ expresses is not something that is essentially private (de Laguna 
makes this last point, and further elaborates on her argument, in ‘Dualism in animal psychology’ 
(1918b)). 
 Part of the significance of EC’s arguments becomes clear when de Laguna states that their 
target is Hugo Münsterberg’s hypothesis that similar changes in mental processes are ontologically 
determined, i.e., are constituted, by similar changes in the central nervous system (1918a, p. 535; 
Strong 1892, p. 183 & p. 187). Münsterberg’s position is a variant of type physicalism, a position Ullin 
T. Place introduced into analytic philosophy in his 1956 paper, ‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’ 
According to type physicalism, kinds of mental states are ontologically determined by, or identical 
with, kinds of brain or central nervous system states. Further, EC’s criticism of Münsterberg’s 
hypothesis applies to type physicalism in general. The criticism tells us that many kinds of mental 
phenomena are not known to be, and do not appear to be, correlated in a one-to-one way with 
kinds of physiological ones. More fundamentally, type physicalism classifies neurological states 
solely in physiological terms, thus closing the way to situating such states in the behavioural context 
in which their relations to mental states might be explained.   
Just as de Laguna’s criticism of type physicalism is partly based on the idea that kinds of 
mental phenomena need not be resolvable into kinds of neurological phenomena, so too were the 
already mentioned multiple-realizability-based arguments of Putnam and Fodor, which also targeted 
type-physicalism. Indeed, such arguments (Ney 2008) led to the introduction of functionalist 
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theories of mind into analytic philosophy in the 1960s. De Laguna, we will see in the next section, 
would agree with the functionalist that the classification of a mental state depends on its causal 
relations to perceptions, to other mental states and to behaviour.3 But the functionalist position is 
that these causal dependencies suffice to classify mental states. From EC’s perspective, some mental 
states must be classified by their social roles.4  
It is, finally, notable that EC’s use of a private language argument has affinities with Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s later, influential use of one in his 1953 book, Philosophical Investigations (2009). Like 
her, Wittgenstein maintains that speakers can only refer to mental states using terms that fulfil a 
social function. Indeed, Wittgenstein’s argument aims to support his broader view that shared 
behaviour is required to make possible the use, and thus the meaning, of phrases (Candlish and 
Wrisley 2019). De Laguna, as we have seen, agrees. Unlike Wittgenstein, however, de Laguna aims to 
develop an empirical theory of speech and mind. 
 
4. Behaviour, language and mind 
4.1 De Laguna on behaviour, speech and cognition 
This section focuses on de Laguna’s 1927 book Speech: Its Function and Development (Speech). I first 
sketch some of Speech’s theory of behaviour, speech and cognition. I then present Speech’s theory 
of cognition-based criticism of pragmatism and relate this criticism to key ideas in Willard V. Quine’s 
1951 paper, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (Two Dogmas). 
 In line with EC’s rejection of the view that language expresses private mental states, Speech 
hypothesises that speech primarily functions to coordinate the behaviour of members of human 
groups (1927, pp. 9-10 & 19-20). Speech argues for the pursuit worthiness of this hypothesis largely 
 
3 Thus, although de Laguna refers to herself as a behaviourist (1927), she rejects logical behaviourism, the view 
that concepts of mental states are just concepts of dispositions to behaviour.  
4 So, when de Laguna talks about roles or functions, she is concerned with end-directed roles. The functions of 
modern functionalism are merely causal roles. 
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by using it to explain aspects of the evolution of speech, along with speech’s characteristic structure, 
and to explain why the development of the human mind, speech and society go together (ibid., pp. x 
& 3-21). 
When a specific type of stimuli tends directly and unconditionally to elicit a specific type of 
response, de Laguna calls the response a ‘type-response’. For example, the alarm cry of a member of 
a flock of birds tends directly and unconditionally to result in the flock taking flight, so that the flight 
counts as a type-response. According to Speech, the simplest form of animal cry is one that elicits 
type-responses (ibid., pp. 36-40 & 42). Speech’s control of behaviour, by contrast, is conditional in 
that whether it elicits a response, and which response it elicits, depends on external conditions, as 
well as on culture and individual psychological state. Speech’s control of behaviour is also indirect, in 
that speech can be evoked by circumstances that are not of themselves of interest or concern to 
involved speakers (ibid., pp. 42-43). What drives the evolution of speech is that its conditional and 
indirect nature enables more flexible control of group behaviour than does the animal cry (ibid., pp. 
92-101). Such flexibility probably begins to provide a distinct evolutionary advantage during the 
transition from arboreal life to ground dwelling (ibid., pp. 46-63). 
The development of speech drives, and requires, the development of cognition. Speech 
involves complete acts that are composed of partial acts (ibid., pp. 277-286). Complete acts are 
functional wholes which attain their goals upon completion. Partial acts are acts the completion of 
which need not involve fulfilling a goal but that can be combined in various ways to form complete 
acts (ibid., pp. 145-149, 161-163 & 168-175). The act of seeing-reaching-eating might, for example, 
be a complete act, with seeing the food as a composing, partial act (ibid., p. 297). Such 
compositional behaviour requires, as well as enables, sophisticated cognition. At a minimum, 
cognition must be sophisticated enough to anticipate the completion of a complete act when 
carrying out one of its composing partial acts (ibid., pp. 174-181). Conversely, the sophistication of 
cognition depends on the organism’s ability to respond to stimuli. 
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An organism has cognition of some phenomenon if the organism’s responses to the 
phenomenon are regular in that, given a fixed internal state of the organism, responses correlate 
types of stimulus patterns related to the phenomenon with types of response. The organism’s 
responses to the phenomenon must also be systematically related to each other. An organism with 
minimal cognition of some phenomenon will exhibit a repertoire of type-responses to stimuli 
involving the phenomenon and these responses will be related by sharing a goal. Minimal cognition 
only involves representing objects in relation to very specific activities. Cognitive ability increases 
with an organism’s ability to recombine the behavioural elements of its responses into complete 
responses and with its ability to reuse behavioural elements across different activities and thus 
across different goals. Humans’ ability to relate responses across an indefinite number of activities 
means that humans can represent objects as such, that is, can represent objects in relation to each 
other and in relation to subjects (ibid., pp. 189-191). Importantly, since human responses are related 
systematically across an indefinite number of goals, such responses are conditional not merely on 
stimulus patterns and goals in specific circumstances, but also on systems of representational states 
that remain stable across circumstances. 
 Cows, for example, respond to grass in a regular and systematic way. The response depends, 
in a regular way, on the type of grass-environment and on the state of the cow, specifically on 
whether it is hungry and perceives the feeding opportunity. So too, the response is systematic. It is 
part of a repertoire of related responses to grass which differ from each other in the way they 
combine the partial acts involved in cropping grass and not cropping grass when the cow aims to eat. 
But systematicity and conditionality are limited here, though the cow’s cognition is far from minimal. 
It is only in the context of eating, and only as a function of the type of grass-environment, that cows 
exhibit grass-related behaviour. The cow, accordingly, can only represent a grass-environment in 
relation to its eating. The cow cannot represent grass as such (ibid., pp. 192-193 & 195). A human 
being’s responses to, say, rice are systematic in that they are interrelated not only in the context of 
eating but across an indefinite number of other contexts, including, e.g., learning or wedding exits. 
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Moreover, this system of responses is sensitive not only to variations in rice’s relations to humans 
across contexts, but also to rice’s relations to non-human objects. The human can thus represent 
grass as such. It is because of the ability to represent objects as such that the human’s “psychological 
environment includes, in addition to values and secondary qualities,” which are just objects in 
relation to us, “also real shapes, causes and effects, and the inner structure of the world to an 
indefinite extent” (ibid., p. 134). 
De Laguna ’s view that cognition correlates stimuli and behavioural responses implies that, if 
we are to provide an account of a type of mental state, we will have to provide a causal story about 
how that type relates families of stimuli and behavioural responses. Further, given that she takes 
speech behaviour to be key to human cognition, characterising the causal relations between 
cognition and speech will be key to characterising types of cognitive states which, like belief, are 
characteristic of humans. Characterisations of such a type of state will also have to include a 
characterisation of the systems of representations it belongs to and of the highly conditional way in 
which it guides behaviour. This is so because human responses are highly conditional and reflect 
cognition of objects as such. Importantly, given de Laguna’s view that types of mental states are 
classified by their teleological roles, the causal relations that make some mental state the type of 
mental state it is will be those that hold when the state is fulfilling its evolved role. 
Speech’s steps towards a theory of belief–steps that only aim to provide some necessary 
conditions for belief and that are only partially spelled out here–illustrate how, according to de 
Laguna, types of mental phenomena are to be analysed. A belief, on her view, is a state that leads to 
(a species of) expectation but does so conditionally on the believer’s affective attitudes and system 
of largely socially determined (often implicit) presumptions (ibid., pp. 326-328 & 333). For example, 
the belief that the water is wet and cold leads, given the appropriate conditions, including 
appropriate presumptions, to the expectation of the wetness and coldness of the water. The species 
of expectation associated with belief differs from belief partly because such expectations represent 
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perceptual presence, or some other subject-relative object, rather than objects as such (ibid., p. 
326). De Laguna notes that it is crucial to distinguish between belief and related pathological and 
quasi-pathological mental states such as psychological suggestion, thus making clear that the causal 
relations which she takes to be constitutive of belief are those it bears when fulfilling its proper role 
(ibid., p. 334). 
 Belief is a conditional determinant of action in the same way that it is a conditional 
determinant of expectations. Further, belief is a commitment to action that is mediated by what de 
Laguna terms, ‘the speech act of assent’–the act of verbally accepting some matter of fact–and is 
commonly followed  by (internal or external) speech that is a positive preparation for action under 
appropriate conditions (ibid., pp. 329-330). Indeed,  
[a]t a higher level of development, the action to which belief in a proposition commits one is 
almost entirely the action of speech itself. The relation of the more abstract beliefs to the 
life of common action becomes so indirect as sometimes to be practically negligible (ibid., 
pp. 330-331). 
That the role of belief in regulating group behaviour is, on de Laguna’s view, part of what constitutes 
belief is clear because all belief, including perceptually based belief, is supposed to be largely socially 
determined. Indeed, belief proper “appears in the acceptance of the announcements of others as 
determining one’s own attitudes and acts” (ibid., p. 327). 
Thought, in the sense Speech is concerned with, is more indirectly related to action than 
belief. Thought is the revision of the conditions under which, and the aims for which, action is to 
take place. Thus, thought is no mere planning for action but rather includes reformulating the rules 
and procedures for, and goals of, such planning (ibid., pp. 337-340). To offer an example in which the 
conditions and ends of action are reformulated, “the re-conceiving of health and disease by 
Alcmaeon, in terms of a balance of the constituents of the body, not only brought the different 
ailments under a single unifying category, but it opened the way to a new and systematic practice of 
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medicine” (ibid. p. 340). In some cases, revising the conditions under which action takes place 
involves revising the conditions of the conditions for action and thus specifying the rules of 
rationality (ibid., p. 340). 
In reformulating the conditions and goals of action, thought has the function of transforming 
the presuppositions involved in belief and thereby reorganising systems of beliefs and expectations. 
Finally, thought is a kind of internal discussion, and thus of internalised speech, that aims at 
promoting agreement. Thus, thought always proceeds under the pressure of the internalised, shared 
standards that function to promote agreement (ibid., pp. 340-348). 
 
4.2 De Laguna’s sympathetic critique of pragmatism and of two dogmas of empiricism 
We can now understand an important strand in de Laguna’s criticism of pragmatism and how this 
strand relates to Quine’s Two Dogmas. In Speech, she writes that pragmatists, especially William 
James, have held that beliefs that have no specific consequences for action are meaningless (ibid., p. 
332). In Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in Modern Philosophy (Dogmatism and Evolution)–a 1910 
book she wrote with her husband–the pragmatist position is stated more sharply: it is the view that 
one can analyse the meaning of a belief in terms of what it tells us to do, given our goals and 
external circumstances (1910, pp. 126-127). Such a view, according to Speech and Dogmatism and 
Evolution, fails to take the conditional nature of belief into account. As Speech puts it, 
[a]s a matter of fact, no believed proposition taken by itself is capable of determining any 
specific act, nor does it independently imply any other proposition. It is only a conditional 
determinant of either the primary acts that are ascribed to it, or the secondary assertions in 
language of other propositions (1927, pp. 332-333; cf. 1910, p. 205). 
De Laguna recognises that pragmatists understand that beliefs are evaluated holistically, as parts of 
systems, rather than individually (1910, p. 129). But her point is that this understanding has 
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implications that pragmatists had not yet adequately recognised. If one accepts that it is only as a 
collective that beliefs have implications for action, one must accept that no individual belief has a 
package of implications for behaviour that might be identified with its meaning. Given that mental 
states are to be understood in terms of their functions and that the function of belief is the 
conditional determination of collective action, de Laguna supposes, with some hedging, that the 
meaning of a specific verbal expression of belief is fixed by what specifies the conditions under 
which the belief determines action and thus by the system of presumptions to which it belongs 
(1927, pp. 328-331). 
De Laguna also targets the pragmatist conception of thought. As de Laguna understands it, 
the pragmatist view is that thought always aims to address some specific, rather than general, 
problem that arises in specific conditions. Further, thought succeeds in resolving its problems when 
it issues in belief and thus in consequences for overt behaviour (ibid., p. 353). The criterion for 
evaluating thought, the pragmatist accordingly accepts, is success in guiding behaviour. De Laguna is 
sympathetic to the pragmatist position and holds that, ultimately, all thought is evaluated in light of 
its role in guiding overt conduct. As Dogmatism and Evolution puts it,  
[w]e must not, of course, fail to recognize that mental behavior can never become more 
than relatively independent of overt conduct. Its roots are in practical and social life, and the 
very condition of its health lies in an ever renewed contact with, and adaptation to, the 
changing phases of such life (1910, p. 198). 
But the pragmatist’s claim that all thought is concerned with specific problems fails, according to de 
Laguna, sufficiently to take into account the social function of thought. In addition to thought’s being 
constrained by the world, via its success in guiding conduct, it also is, and must be, constrained by 
the social function of securing agreement and thus by standards that operate relatively 
independently of their success in guiding primary behaviour, that is, behaviour that is a direct 
response to objects in the environment (1927, pp. 37 & 350-352). Moreover, the existence of such 
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relatively independent standards involves the existence of standards that operate relatively 
independently of specific problem contexts and that are relatively general in their applicability (ibid., 
pp. 353-355). 
De Laguna’s criticism of the pragmatist’s conception of belief is close to Quine’s later, often 
supposed to be revolutionary, criticism of logical positivism in Two Dogmas. There, Quine rejects what 
he takes to be the positivist proposal that each belief comes with its own implications for experience 
and thus its own empirical meaning, arguing instead that it is only as systems that beliefs have 
empirical implications and thus meaning (1951, pp. 35-39). This is de Laguna’s point against the 
pragmatists when she complains that they fail to recognise the implications of the observation that 
beliefs are evaluated holistically. Indeed, like Two Dogmas (ibid., p. 39), Dogmatism and Evolution 
associates the view that meanings are fixed systematically with the view that all beliefs are to some 
degree synthetic, in the sense of being true by virtue of the empirical facts, and thus that their 
assessment always depends on their success in guiding conduct (Katzav, forthcoming). 
 
5. Naturalistic and existentialist ontology 
5.1 Potentiality, individuality and the problem of universals 
I now turn to de Laguna’s 1966 book Existence and the Human World (Existence), which collects, and 
builds on, papers published during the period 1941-1963 and does so in order to present aspects of 
her ontology. One of the questions addressed in Existence is how universals, conceived of as beings 
that can be multiply instantiated, can be related to individuals, conceived of as a kind of concrete 
existent. A second question is why only certain universals come to be found in our world (Existence, 
pp. 43-44). De Laguna’s response to these questions posits an unfamiliar category of being, the ideal 
continuum. The ideal continuum is the inexhaustible, potential aggregate of instantiated essences, a 
potential the being of which is independent of all actually instantiated essences and all individuals. 
Thus, any actually instantiated essence, e.g., a specific human’s instance of rationality, is conceived 
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of as an actualisation of the ideal continuum. Two instances of the same essence are conceived of as 
two qualitatively identical actualisations of the continuum. The ideal continuum is inexhaustible in 
that it is the potential for an infinite multiplicity of instances of essences, and is independent of 
individuals and essences in that it could have been actualised by individuals and essences other than 
those that actually do so (ibid., pp. 50-52). 
 Universals’ instances are, in addition to being actualisations of the ideal continuum, 
constituents of, or ingredients in, individuals (ibid., pp. 40 & 51). Moreover, universals are 
ontologically dependent on their actual instances; as de Laguna puts it, “[a]part from the existence 
of concrete individuals there are no essences” (ibid., p. 51). Further, she thinks of universals as 
conditional potentialities for actualisation, that is, as potentialities that actualise or manifest certain 
effects in the appropriate spatiotemporal circumstances (ibid., pp. 40-41). Finally, universals should 
not be thought of as one-place properties. An individual’s having some potentiality involves that 
individual’s being appropriately related to other individuals with reciprocal potentialities, where 
reciprocal potentialities are potentialities that can only be actualised jointly. That individuals’ 
potentialities are not one-place properties implies that what kind of individual an individual is is not 
independent of what other kinds of individuals there are. Hydrogen’s potential for combustion, for 
example, has reciprocal potentialities that are essential to oxygen, so that hydrogen cannot be 
combustible unless oxygen exists (ibid., pp. 52-54).  
While universals are ingredients in individuals, each individual’s unrepeatability means that 
it is more than a collection of instances of universals. The individual is also ultimately a ‘this-here-
and-now’. In paradoxical terms, an individual is, ultimately and necessarily, qualitatively unique. 
Thus, all individuals combine their fundamental, qualitative uniqueness and their universals or 
potentialities. Further, it is the individual which acts to realise its potentialities. As a result, its 
actions are also qualitatively unique. Because individuals and their actions are unique, neither 
individuals nor their actions can be exhaustively described in general terms (ibid., pp. 36-37, 57-59 & 
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77-78). The uniqueness of individuals’ individuality also means that individuality should be 
distinguished from existence. Existence is the mode of being that is shared by individuals (ibid., pp. 
36 & 43). An individual’s existence is, at least in part, the individual’s continuous actualisation of 
certain potentialities that are basic in that they are essential for the actualisation of the individuals’ 
other potentialities; in other terms, the existence of an individual is in part its self-maintaining, 
continuous actualisation of the ideal continuum (ibid., pp. 62 & 95-96). 
Because the network of reciprocity between actual potentialities is rich, the 
interdependence between the existence of different kinds of individuals is extensive (ibid., pp. 52-
53). Indeed, the network of reciprocity between potentialities is, according to de Laguna, such that 
“the coming into existence of any individual…carries with it the coming into existence of a world” 
(ibid., p. 53). Further, since universals are actualisations of the ideal continuum, the coming into 
existence of a world involves a partial structuring of the ideal continuum; the continuum is partially 
actualised in the reciprocal potentialities of individuals. Importantly, many of these potentialities are 
indeterminate to some degree or another. An indeterminate potentiality is a determinable that is 
possessed by an individual without the corresponding determination. For example, a coloured object 
without any specific colour would be an object with an indeterminate potentiality, according to de 
Laguna. Indeterminate potentialities determine the structure of the world, that is, they constrain 
which determinate potentialities might come to be instantiated, but do not determine which 
individuals exist or which determinate essences are instantiated (ibid., pp. 52-54). 
It is the activity of individuals that ultimately brings about change, including the structuring 
of the ideal continuum, the increasing determinateness of universals and the creation of new 
individuals and kinds of individuals (ibid., pp. 59-60). As the kinds of individuals found in the world 
change, indeterminate potentialities become more determinate and some become fully 
determinate. Moreover, as a potentiality becomes more determinate, its actualisation comes closer 
to being a real possibility; the potentiality’s actualisation is a real possibility when the potentiality is 
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fully determinate (ibid., p. 53). By way of illustration, the hydrogen in a world without oxygen would 
not be combustible but would have the determinable property of potential combustibility. This 
potential combustibility would, were oxygen to come into existence in the same world as the 
hydrogen, become more determinate and come closer to being actualised. Indeed, if all the 
conditions for the actualisation of, say, a canister of hydrogen’s potential combustibility were 
fulfilled–perhaps the hydrogen needs to be in the same solar system as the oxygen–the hydrogen’s 
potential combustibility would be actualised and the hydrogen would be combustible (ibid., p. 42). 
The discussion of universals in Existence targets views, such as those of Alfred N. Whitehead 
and George Santayana, according to which universals are independent of time and the individuals in 
it. If we think of universals as being independent in this way, it will be unclear how universals might 
be related to temporal individuals and, further, it will be inexplicable why only certain universals do 
come to be so related (ibid., pp. 43-50). On de Laguna’s view, by contrast, the activity of temporal 
individuals brings universals into being. The ideal continuum does not contain universals. It is merely 
the continuum of potentialities for instances of universals. As for why some universals come into 
being and others do not, this is explained by the individual driven structuring of the ideal continuum 
and the constraints this structuring places on what might be.  
 
5.2 A naturalistic critique and appreciation of Heidegger’s existentialism 
De Laguna’s tale of the structuring of the ideal continuum includes, as we have seen, a view about 
the existence of individuals. The existence of individuals is, at least in part, their continuous self-
maintaining activity of actualising the ideal continuum. De Laguna continues to develop this view 
into the beginnings of an ontology of nature. For example, she describes, and distinguishes between, 
the modes of existence of nonbiological individuals, organisms and human beings (ibid., pp. 62-68). 
In this context, she contrasts her own treatment of existence with Heidegger’s treatment of the 
being of humans–what he calls ‘Existenz’–in his book, Being and Time (ibid., p. 82). 
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According to Heidegger, humans alone are able to ask, and ask, what the being of beings 
amounts to. Further, humans are distinguished by having a preliminary understanding of their own 
mode of being and, as a result, of the being of all beings; this preliminary understanding consists in 
the understanding that their own being comprises being able to ask about, and having some 
understanding of, the nature of being (ibid., pp. 82-83). But Heidegger adds that our self-
understanding, and thus our being, is incomplete. Heidegger here is to be understood as making an 
ontological claim; there is a certain mode of being that characterises humanity, one in which we are 
related to ourselves in a certain way, via understanding, and this way of being involves 
incompleteness. For Heidegger, our incompleteness is an issue for us, one we are free to overcome 
by actualising our own potential for self-understanding and free to succumb to by not actualising 
this potential (ibid., pp. 83-84). Importantly, from de Laguna’s perspective, Heidegger thinks of our 
incompleteness as a positive potentiality for being. Also important, our self-understanding and thus 
our being is to be understood as a form of care for ourselves. It aims at a certain kind of self-
maintenance, one which involves realising our characteristic potentialities (ibid., pp. 84-85). 
 The first problem de Laguna raises for Heidegger concerns his treatment of the being of 
nonhumans. Heidegger characterises the being of nonhumans insofar as they are encountered in the 
human world, that is, in the world revealed by care. As beings that are encountered, their being can 
involve being present-at-hand, that is, can involve a complete lack of potentiality/being wholly 
present. This is compatible with its being the case that it is only as encountered that nonhuman 
beings might lack potentiality. But Heidegger is explicit that nonhumans do not share in care; their 
mode of being is mere existence rather than Existenz. Moreover, care is the only mode of being that 
he recognises and does not characterise merely as something encountered. He thus must suppose 
that, when nonhumans are present at hand, their being is their presence (ibid., pp. 85-86). 
Heidegger’s position is, accordingly, a dualist one; it recognises care–a form of potentiality–and 
presence–having no potentiality–as two modes of being that share nothing. As a result, Heidegger 
fails to provide what he promises, namely an account of the being of all beings (ibid., pp. 88-89). 
23 
 
Indeed, he tells us no more about the being of nonhuman beings than that it involves somehow 
being encountered. As a result, his position threatens to lapse into idealism, a position he aims to 
overcome. Here, de Laguna finds it particularly telling that, while Heidegger recognises that the 
being of living, nonhumans poses a distinct ontological problem, the problem is not one he 
addresses. This, on her view, underlines his failure to escape idealism and to provide a general 
account of being. Further, since Heidegger never identifies a specific ontological problem concerning 
nonliving, nonhuman beings, he provides further reason to suspect that he must take their being to 
be exhausted in their being encountered by us (ibid., pp. 86-88). 
 A related problem for Heidegger concerns the provision of an adequate ontological 
interpretation of the evolution of human beings. According to Heidegger, our self-concern, and thus 
our being, is a condition for encountering beings in nature. As a result, if the being of beings in 
nature is exhausted by their being encountered, the question of how our being emerged from that 
of nature is confused. It asks for the temporal origin of something that makes nature, including time, 
possible. For de Laguna, however, the philosopher must explain the evolution of our mode of being. 
Not unrelated, the philosopher must reject an inexplicable chasm between the being of humans and 
that of animals. These requirements, on her view, are a corollary of the discovery that beings evolve 
(ibid., pp. 99-100). 
 De Laguna’s criticism, then, is that Heidegger’s ontology fails on its own terms because it 
creates a chasm between nonhuman and human modes of existence, and does not provide an 
adequate account of nonhuman being. Equally, these are failures in light of the evolution of human 
beings and the implied need for an evolutionary account of being. Nevertheless, de Laguna is 
sympathetic to much of Heidegger’s conception of ontology. She too thinks that ontology centres on 
an investigation of what it is for beings to be, as we will see. Moreover, she agrees that 
incompleteness is an important ingredient in our existence. She merely argues that this 
incompleteness must be thought of as an ingredient in the existence of all individuals, living and 
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non-living alike. The existence of all individuals includes potentiality and one or another form of self-
maintenance. 
  
6. On what it is for people to exist 
People share a special mode of self-maintenance and thus of existence, one that involves the 
cultural world (ibid., pp. 148-149). The cultural world is a world of convention and historical 
tradition, and includes people, their behaviour, their social roles, a conceptual repertoire and an 
associated set of values. The conceptual repertoire and set of values make possible, and play a role 
in causally determining, the patterns of objects experienced by the people inhabiting the cultural 
world as well as the people themselves, their interrelations, including their social roles, and their 
activities. Conversely, the patterns exhibited by objects and people found in the cultural world make 
possible, and have a role in causally determining, its conceptual repertoire and values. Thus, people 
depend for their existence on the cultural world’s conceptual repertoire and values. At the same 
time, however, the cultural world depends for its existence on people. What is distinctive about the 
mode of existence of people is that it includes the activity of maintaining the culturally patterned 
human community and its way of life (ibid., pp. 109-112 & 149-150). 
 Maintaining the cultural world includes playing, and combining, multiple social roles from 
among those roles, and combinations of roles, which are enabled by the cultural world (ibid., pp. 
112-113). But, recall, the individual and the individual’s acts are supposed to be unique. Roles, by 
contrast, are repeatable. As a result, no role exhausts a person’s potentialities for acting. Moreover, 
each individual person carries out specific roles, and amalgamates multiple roles, in a unique way. 
Thus, according to de Laguna, being a person involves playing social roles but doing so in a way that 
reflects one’s individuality and transforms the cultural world (ibid., pp. 113-114 & 119). 
 Individualised role-playing behaviour, and thus the existence of a person, involves exercising 
characteristic cognitive capacities, including the capacity to abstractly discriminate whether objects 
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and persons belong to culturally recognised classes and whether ways of behaving conform to 
established custom (ibid., p. 115). Not surprisingly, these cognitive capacities are among those de 
Laguna ties to the development of speech and objective cognition in Speech. So, the evolution of the 
group behaviour supporting cognition of humans outlined in Speech, including of thought and belief 
formation, is supposed to be part of the existential change that involves the creation of people and 
the cultural world they inhabit. Importantly, the capacities required for being a person also include 
capacities for non-primary emotions such as admiration and contempt, and for evaluative attitudes 
such as approval and disapproval. According to de Laguna, the capacities for conceptualisation, for 
non-primary emotions and for evaluative attitudes are interdependent. For example, we might 
admire someone for their courage, and thus as belonging to a conceptualised class. Or we might 
have contempt for someone for their cowardice. Conversely, the sharing of feelings such as 
admiration and contempt is a necessary condition for symbolic communication in ceremony, 
tradition and language (ibid., pp. 115-117). Further, since acquiring capacities for conceptualisation, 
emotion and moral evaluation is required for being a person, so too is participating vicariously, via 
the sharing of stories, in the shared story of a community, that is, so too is having a history. For it is 
only through the sharing of stories of a common past that the individuals of a community can 
acquire its values and standards, and thus develop the capacity for having non-primary emotions 
and evaluative attitudes (ibid., pp. 117-118). 
 I will bring out one more aspect of the conception of the existence of a person put forward 
in Existence. The person must be a self and recognise itself and others as selves. This means, in part, 
that the person must acquire intellectual and emotional knowledge of itself as an object of 
knowledge and as a moral being. Knowledge of one’s self as a moral being involves conceptualising 
oneself as an individual among others who are subject to judgement in accordance with available, 
general standards of right and wrong. Knowledge of one’s self as a moral being also involves 
exercising self-control (ibid., pp. 119-120 & 125-126). And while the self of which we become aware 
is initially the one presented to us by others’ feelings and attitudes towards us, this self is 
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transformed by self-knowledge. Learning about one’s self invariably involves a change in who one is 
and thus always results in incomplete and inadequate self-knowledge (ibid., pp. 121-122 &128-129). 
Finally, the idea we acquire of ourselves in the development of the self is, in part, a self-ideal. The 
idea of the self has a normative dimension to which we aim to conform, one reflecting and altering 
the ideals of our culture (ibid., pp. 130-131). 
 
7. The nature of speculative philosophy 
Existence’s discussion of the person leads on to its treatment of the problems of freedom, of value 
and its relation to existence, of rationality and its dependence on culture, of the relationship 
between the Lebenswelt of European philosophy and the cultural world as de Laguna understands it 
and, finally, of cultural relativism and science. In the space that remains, I can only focus on the 
conception of speculative philosophy that Existence exemplifies. De Laguna’s 1951 paper 
‘Speculative philosophy’ (SP) provides a succinct statement of her vision of such philosophy; more 
extended discussion is found in her 1936 paper, ‘Being and knowing: a dialectical study’ (BK). Speech 
and Existence provide further, scattered information about her views. As she understands it, 
speculative philosophy includes ontology, conceived of as inquiry into the nature of being (1936; 
1951, p. 4; 1966, p. 27). Inquiry into the nature of being involves inquiry into what the various modes 
of being are and a consideration of whether specific modes of being are ultimate or fundamental. 
More importantly, according to de Laguna, ontology includes the systematic consideration of how 
different, fundamental modes of being are related to each other (1966, p. 27). This means, since 
evolution gives rise to new, fundamental modes of being, that ontology includes the always 
incomplete story of how being evolves. Moreover, since the acquisition of knowledge is itself the 
development of a new, fundamental and always evolving mode of being, ontology includes the 
always incomplete story of how knowledge develops, from the emergence of simple cognition to 
that of scientific knowledge in its various forms and of epistemology, the knowledge of knowledge. 
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Thus, ontology includes natural philosophy and epistemology (1936, pp. 438-439; 1951, pp. 4-5; 
1966, pp. 63-64 & 99-100). Ontology depends on epistemology not only for completeness but also 
for justification. An ontology, as a claim to knowledge, has an (at least) implicit epistemology. The 
extension of an ontology with the aim of showing how the thinker and her knowledge is a part of 
nature and, more broadly, being is accordingly an attempt to show that the ontology is coherent. 
Correlatively, an epistemology’s commitment to the existence of knowers and to objects of 
knowledge means it has an (at least) implicit ontology. The development of an ontology that fits an 
epistemology is accordingly an attempt to show that the epistemology is coherent. Demonstrating 
the coherence of an ontology and an epistemology would be a justification of both (1936, pp. 454-
455; 1951, pp. 4-5). 
 De Laguna’s vision of speculative thought fits well with her own work. Her general account 
of the individual is a part of a sketch of an ontology, a sketch which covers the evolution of modes of 
existence, from those of pre-biological individuals to those of persons along with their ability for 
objective knowledge. Similarly, her account of human cognition in Speech and in Dogmatism and 
Evolution is part of her ontology and not just her epistemology. The account is, since it describes the 
way in which human cognition might have evolved, a step towards showing how human knowledge, 
including the knowledge of knowledge, might fit within nature. 
 A further aspect of speculative philosophy as de Laguna understands it is its commitment to 
naturalism. The speculative philosopher’s attempt to provide a coherent ontology and epistemology 
must not only be an interpretation of experience, it must provide interpretations that are 
appropriately constrained by the special sciences. More specifically, the speculative philosopher is to 
treat being’s development as continuous and explicable, and thus her explanations should start from 
observations and explanations offered by the special sciences and should include forms that are, like 
evolutionary explanations, akin to those found in science (1951, pp. 15-16; 1966, pp. 99-100). That 
this requirement is key to de Laguna’s work is clear in her career long insistence that ontology 
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should provide an evolutionary account of the development of cognition. The need to evaluate 
ontology in light of its interpretation of scientific experience is also seen in the more abstract parts 
of her ontology. For instance, her theory of how universals become determinate over time 
generalises from scientific hypotheses in a variety of ways, including not only by raising the already 
mentioned hypothesis that evolutionary explanations can be extended to pre-organic matter and to 
human history, but also, for example, by proposing (1966, p. 98) that each individual’s existence 
comes to an end.  
Importantly, de Laguna insists that speculative philosophy’s engagement with science should 
involve speculation that goes beyond available science as well as criticism of available science (1951, 
pp. 4 & 16). For example, Speech does not tend to limit itself to examining the implications of the 
scientific theories of its day when it comes to theorising about speech and cognition, or even to limit 
itself to analysing or theorising about what were then the known facts about speech and cognition. 
Speech ambitiously extends scientific theory, makes novel claims about particular evolutionary 
transitions and extends evolutionary explanation to historical evolution. Similar ambition drives the 
claims that pre-biological evolution occurs. De Laguna turns to criticism of science in claiming, for 
example, that each special science provides a perspective on phenomena that is conditional on 
assumptions about individuation and classification. Because of this conditionality, scientists are not, 
as scientists, in a position to settle questions about what the ultimate elements of reality are (1917b; 
1966, p. 5). Relatedly, science’s reliance on general principles of classification means that it is limited 
to providing general characterisations of phenomena and thus cannot fully characterise individuals 
or their actions (1917b, p. 182; 1966, pp. 63-64 & 77-78). 
The requirement that speculative philosophy interpret experience and draw on science is 
not, according to de Laguna, sufficient to make such philosophy scientific: 
[t]he speculative metaphysician differs from the scientist in that the metaphysician aims to 
make the world and his own place in it imaginatively intelligible to himself in terms 
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communicable to others. He does not set up hypotheses to be proved or disproved. And 
while he must strive for clarity and consistency, he must to some degree rely on metaphor 
and think in terms that escape the demands of logical consistency (1966, pp. 63-64). 
Thus, the speculative philosopher’s goal in interpreting experience is not to test her interpretations 
in the way a scientist does but only to make shareable, systematic sense of experience. At most, 
speculative philosophy might sometimes lead to new developments in science. According to de 
Laguna, for example, it is only by trying to trace the evolution of human cognition that we may 
“hope in time to replace epistemology by a scientific psychology of cognition” (1927, p. 207). 
Further, speculative philosophy differs from science in using contradiction and metaphor in order to 
characterise the ultimate constituents of reality. The speculative use of metaphor and contradiction 
is found in de Laguna’s discussion of individuality, for example. Individuality cannot literally be 
characterised in general terms, but the speculative philosopher aims to deploy general terms such as 
‘qualitative uniqueness’ in order to characterise, in a metaphorical and paradoxical way, individuality 
(for more on the use of metaphor in philosophical speculation, see de Laguna’s 1972 paper, but only 
posthumously published, ‘The Individual and the Continuum’ (1981)). 
De Laguna develops her naturalism in the early decades of the twentieth century, when 
(Verhaegh 2018) naturalism was not yet part of analytic philosophy and, indeed, when key analytic 
philosophers such as George E. Moore and Gilbert Ryle aimed to exclude naturalism from 
mainstream philosophy (Katzav and Vaesen 2017; Vaesen and Katzav 2019). It is only under the 
influence of Quine in the 1950s and 1960s that naturalism is accepted in analytic philosophy 
(Verhaegh 2018). Even during these decades, however, the kind of systematic imaginative 
philosophy de Laguna produced, especially aspects of it that go beyond and criticise science in 
substantive ways, were not welcome in analytic philosophy (Katzav 2018). Something like de 
Laguna’s reimagining of our place in the world became common in continental philosophy. Yet 
twentieth-century continental philosophy did not have at its heart her commitment to scientifically 
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informed naturalism. The way she combined naturalism with a penchant for speculative thought was 
characteristic of much twentieth-century American speculative philosophy, including key 
pragmatists, such as Charles S. Peirce, process philosophers, such as Whitehead, and Hegelians, such 
as Creighton (De Laguna 1951; Katzav forthcoming).5 
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